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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: The aim of the research is to build an index of fiscal illusion to assess the size of 
the problem in regards to the euro area countries in the period 2004-2016.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: The analysis of fiscal illusion phenomenon is based on 
critical analysis of public finance literature which helped in indicating the main sources of 
fiscal illusion and capturing its different dimensions. In addition, literature analysis enabled 
the selection of the most appropriate measures related to various aspects of illusion. Initially, 
the principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted to identify main factors which should 
be included in the formula of index. The selected factors were built on the basis of different 
measures and indicators that can be assigned to the selected dimensions of fiscal illusion. 
This allowed to construct the index of fiscal illusion. 
Findings: The authors noticed that economies characterized by a relatively high fiscal 
illusion and low quality of public finance may find it difficult to achieve fiscal sustainability 
in the long-term. In the analyzed period, the highest average value of the fiscal illusion index 
was recorded in Italy (the average FII 0,935), while the lowest in Estonia (the average FII 
0,07). The results of the study revealed the significance of institutional determinants, which 
both influence the quality of public finance and the size of fiscal illusion. 
Practical Implications: The results are important not only for policymakers to understand 
the consequences of their decisions for public finance sustainability, but also for society, 
increasing its awareness of current tax burdens paid and benefits received.  
Originality/Value: The paper discusses the most important issues regarding fiscal illusion 
which seems to be obstacle in achieving public finance sustainability. The results of the 
research certainly enriched the existing knowledge on the phenomenon of fiscal illusion, its 
causes and ways of measurement. 
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The phenomenon of fiscal illusion is associated with the misperception of the fiscal 
burden or the amount of tax paid. Taxpayers regard their tax burden smaller than it 
actually is or adversely perceive their tax burden heavier than it is in fact. The 
occurrence of the fiscal illusion refers to the most countries in Europe and around 
the world. The bigger the size of fiscal illusion, the lower the transparency of public 
finances which in the light of the twenty-first century challenges should be 
characterized by adequate efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
There are several causes of fiscal illusion. In the literature, different authors indicate 
various hypotheses of fiscal illusion, e.g.: the complexity of the tax structure; income 
elasticity of the tax structure; the flypaper effect, renter illusion and debt illusion. 
Fiscal illusion, caused by opportunism of politicians who conduct the irresponsible 
fiscal policy relying on increasing public spending, may lead to deepening public 
debt. Undoubtedly, in the long term, every kind of fiscal illusion negatively affects 
budgetary outcomes and economic performance. The purpose of this study is to: 
 
• analyze the theoretical basis of the phenomenon of fiscal illusion and propose 
the method for its measurement, 
• identify the main causes of fiscal illusion, 
• make some suggestions to different possibilities of measuring the fiscal 
illusion phenomenon, 
• construct the fiscal illusion index for the euro area countries. 
 
The empirical research covered the euro area countries in years 2004-2016 because 
in the case of these economies the deterioration of public finance quality is observed, 
which as a result may negatively affect their long-term performance. There is 
consensus among economists that the lack of transparency in fiscal policy is harmful 
for fiscal outcomes and it raises the need for implementation of additional control 
mechanisms, such as fiscal councils, that should contribute to decreasing fiscal 
illusion between the government and electorate.  
 
The study offers several contributions to the fiscal illusion literature, especially in 
the empirical dimension through broadening the knowledge on factors which can be 
used in the process of construction the fiscal illusion index. The intension is to 
expose the institutional variables that are likely to influence the level of fiscal 
illusion. In opinion of authors the results of the research certainly enriched the 
existing knowledge on the phenomenon of fiscal illusion, its causes and ways of 
measurement.  
 
The discussion is organized as follows. Section II characterizes the fiscal illusion 
concept from theoretical point of view, providing a short review of theoretical 
frameworks for different hypotheses of this phenomenon. Section III presents the 
review of main hypotheses of fiscal illusion and their measurement. Section IV 
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discusses the rationale for the construction of Fiscal Illusion Index. Section V 
considers the methodology for the measurement of fiscal illusion and Section VI 
describes the size of fiscal illusion in the euro area countries. 
 
2. Fiscal Illusion Phenomenon from the Theoretical Point of View 
 
Fiscal illusion phenomenon is studied for over a hundred years, however, interest in 
this area of research has significantly increased in the 60-70 years of the twentieth 
century. The notion of fiscal illusion is associated with the misperception of the 
fiscal burden or the amount of tax paid. (…) Taxpayers regard their tax burden as 
smaller than it actually is (positive version – more often). In negative version 
taxpayers perceive their tax burden in fact to be heavier (Määttä, 2006). The general 
idea of fiscal illusion is that there are certain sources of government revenue that are 
not observed or not fully observed by citizens. If money from these sources is spent, 
some or all citizens benefit from these expenditures, and give support for the growth 
of government. Because the citizens are unaware of the source of these expenditures, 
they do not perceive the pain of paying higher taxes or resign from tax cuts 
preferring the growth of public spending. Thus, spending revenue from sources that 
are hidden from the citizens’ view by fiscal illusion should increase the popularity of 
the government and thus those in government who seek reelection have an obvious 
incentive to spend any revenue that is subject to fiscal illusion, and seek revenue that 
has this characteristic (Mueller, 2003). 
 
Fundamental contributions to the analysis of the phenomenon of fiscal illusion 
brought Italian scientist Amilcare Puviani at the turn of the nineteenth and the 
twentieth century3 (in 1897/1903), in the book titled Teoria della illusion 
finanziaria. In general, the Puviani’s approach to the problem of public finances is 
based on the assumption that the state is a monopoly, therefore, represents a state 
institution through which one group of people has the power to impose their will to 
another group – to those who are governed. Assuming such a concept, fiscal 
structure is seen as an institutional tool used by policy makers to raise funds from 
subordinated groups. These funds serve providing or financing public goods which 
the governed group wants (Buchanan, 1967). 
 
The starting point for considerations of Puviani was the question – how the 
government decision makers, that want to minimise the resistance of taxpayers to the 
level of the tax burden, will take to organise the fiscal system? The answer to the 
above question took the form of a general hypothesis. The governing group tries, 
whenever possible, to create the fiscal illusion, that the tax burden is smaller than it 
actually is. It also creates the other illusion which aims to make the governed group 
think that the value of public goods and services available to them is greater than 
 
3Some economists, e.g., Dollery and Worthington (1996) are convinced that the 
notion/phenomenon of fiscal illusion began to investigate the authors such as J.R. McCullock 
and J.S. Mill. 
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real. Then Puviani proposed to test this hypothesis by examining the reality of the 
existing fiscal structures. The hypothesis applies to both sides of the budget bill, 
illusions apply to both taxes and spending programs (Buchanan, 1967).  
 
As noted by Oates since the Puviani and Italian economists, the work of Buchanan 
(1967) gave the impetus to the development of hypotheses in the field of fiscal 
illusion (Oates, 1988).  Buchanan after analysis of Puviani system took up the study 
of fiscal illusion in the contemporary tax systems (Buchanan, 1960; 1967). 
Buchanan noted that less painful for the taxpayer, is the deduction of part of the 
income for tax purposes - the employer plays a role of tax collector, the employee 
does not directly receive the total sum of wage or salary which are considered as the 
basis for taxation. Subsequently, the institution of the progression gives the taxpayer 
a feeling of excessive tax burden. In the case of social security taxes - the taxpayer 
accepts regular increases in his own taxes, as well as those imposed on his employer, 
assuming that they will be accumulated in order to sustain the cost of his own 
retirement. The taxpayer will put less resistance to such the increases than if he 
would know that they result from the need to comply with current payments to 
beneficiaries. In the case of the corporate income tax – there also is some kind of 
confusion with reference to the person being the final taxpayer (Buchanan, 1967). 
 
The conceptual and empirical work on the theory of fiscal illusion is the paper of 
Wagner “Revenue structure, fiscal illusion and budgetary choice” (1976). The author 
stressed, that the institutional manner in which citizens are required to pay for 
government can effect taxpayer’s perception of the price of government, and, hence, 
the size of the public sector (Wagner, 1976). The Fiscal illusion phenomenon is 
currently the subject a lot of studies and most of them have an empirical nature. 
Oates noted, that in discussion on the phenomenon of fiscal illusion it is possible to 
identify five forms / sources of fiscal illusion (Oates, 1988): 
 
• complexity of the tax structure where the misperception of tax system stems 
from fragmentation of the revenue system,4 
• income elasticity of the tax structure where growth in revenue is associated 
with income elastic forms of taxation,5 
 
4If we take in to account the complexity of the tax structure (revenue complexity) we have a 
lot of researches such as: Wagner (1976), Clotfelter (1976), Pommerehne and Schneider 
(1978), Munley and Greene (1978), Baker (1983), Breeden and Hunter (1985), Cullis and 
Jones (1987, 2009), Berry and Lowery – 1987, Henrekson (1988), Misiolek and Elder 
(1988), Martinez-Vazquez, Harwood and Larkins (1992), Heyndels and Smolders (1994, 
1995), Dollery and Worthington (1995, 1996), Dollery and Worthington (1999), Franzese 
(2002), Hendrick (2002), Caroll (2009), Sanandaji and Wallace (2010), Ehrlich (2011), 
Brogan (2013) Lybeck and Henrekson (2014), Atkinson and Stiglitz 2015 etc. 
5In the case of income elasticity of the tax structure there are the following authors: Oates 
(1975), Craig and Heins (1980), DiLorenzo (1982), Baker (1983), Feenburgand and Rosen 
(1987), Hunter and Scott (1987), Misiolek and Elder (1988), Greene and Hawley (1991), 
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• the flypaper effect – where lump-sum intergovernmental grants have a 
stimulatory effect on public expenditure,6 
• renter illusion with respect to the property taxation which depends on the 
extent of property ownership in a given jurisdiction,7 
• debt illusion where public awareness of the extent public expenditure 
depends more on current taxation than debt financing,8 
 
His point of view is shared by many authors, e.g., Dollery and Worthington (1996)9, 
Dell’Anno and Dollery (2014) and so on.  However, the revenue complexity 
argument is the dominant theory among the fiscal illusion scholars (Brogan, 2014). 
It seems to be very obvious, that the side of revenues is more easier to analyze. Such 
opinion is also shared by many economists. The empirical analysis of fiscal illusion 
has been directed almost exclusively at the revenue side of the fiscal equation with a 
corresponding neglect of the benefits of public sector activity. This asymmetry does 
not necessarily reflect the increased importance of government expenditure relative 
to government output (Dollery and Worthington, 1996).  
 
As Tenreiro de Magalhaes, Jahankhani and Hessami (2010) note, even in the 21st 
century voters do not pay attention to public accounts and it makes them vulnerable 
to fiscal illusion. The very comprehensive work on the fiscal illusion is also the 
Mourão’s paper from 2008. The main problem with the application of the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis is that it is conjectural. Michael J. Brogan (2014) noticed that it is 
very difficult to verify both theoretically and empirically the fiscal illusion 
hypothesis because the argument requires multiple criteria to be satisfied. It may well 
 
Heyndels and Smolders (1994), Dollery and Worthington (1995), Ellen Schwartz (2004), 
Crescenzi (2012), Oates (2013), Döring (2015). 
6 In the case of the flypaper effect: DiLorenzo (1982), Winer 1983, Logan 1986, Hammes and 
Wills (1987), Marshall (1989; 1991), Grossman (1990), Picur (1991), Oates (1991), Stewart 
(1993), Heyndels and Smolders (1994), Dollery and Worthington (1995), Hines and Thaler 
(1995), Ehtisham, Gao, Tanzi (1995), Mueller (1997, 2003), Thompson and Green (1998), 
Dollery, Wallis (2001), Leyden (2006), Boadway, Anwar and Shah (2007), Cullis and Jones 
(2009), Kalb (2010), Lee, Johnson and Joyce (2013), Nicholson-Crotty (2015). 
7 In the case of the renter illusion: Barr and Davis (1966), Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), 
Hanushek (1975), Peterson (1975), Lovell (1978), Gronberg (1980), Martinez-Vazquez 
(1983), Beck (1984), Brazer and McCarty (1987), Schokkaert (1987), Schwab and Zampelli 
(1987), Schneider (1989), Moomau and Morton (1992), Heyndels and Smolders (1994), 
Carroll and Yinger (1994), Worthington (1994), Dalamagas (1993), Dollery and Wallis 
(2001), Crescenzi (2012), Storper (2013), Berger (2016). 
8 In the case of debt illusion we have: Oates (1969), Epple and Schipper (1981),  Brembeck 
(1991), Dalamagas (1992, 1993), Peacock (1997), Dollery and Worthington (1999), Landers 
and Byrnes (2000), Sterling (2010), Montiel (2011), Rizzo (2012), Crescenzi (2012), Dyson 
(2014). 
9Dollery and Worthington (1996) conducted a very comprehensive analysis of the evolution 
of the fiscal illusion concept and its measurement in which the views of the above mentioned 
scientists were taken into consideration. 
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be that the assumptions used in past approaches to fiscal illusion lack the theoretical 
rigour required for empirical analysis (Dollery and Worthington, 1996). 
 
3. The Review of the Main Hypotheses of Fiscal Illusion  
 
The phenomenon of fiscal illusion became the subject of great interest to many 
scientists trying to capture its different dimensions and find the most appropriate 
measures related to  particular aspects of illusion. In the literature, there are at least 
five hypotheses which indicate the sources of fiscal illusion. Taking into account its 
multidimensional nature, a short presentation of the most important hypotheses 
certainly allows for a better understanding of this concept. 
 
Firstly, the revenue-complexity hypothesis, initially defined by Buchanan (1967) 
suggests that the more complicated the revenue system, the more difficult it is for the 
taxpayer to estimate the tax-price of public outputs – and the more likely it is that the 
taxpayer will underestimate the tax burden associated with public programs (Oates, 
1969). The hypothesis also implies that, the more complex the revenue system, the 
larger will be the public budget. It should be noticed that the complexity of tax 
revenue system is often identified with the lack of revenue transparency.  
 
Transparency can be interpret as government providing data and information on 
activity, management, and policies. To put it another way, government revenue is 
transparent if people understand their total tax burden, including fees and license 
costs. However, it rarely happens because of fiscal illusion which causes that 
citizens perceive their tax burden to be lower than it actually is. This misperception 
leads them to believe that public goods cost less than they do, thereby creating 
demand for government services to be beyond what is socially optimal (Afonso, 
2015). The fiscal illusion literature indicates that the complexity of tax system 
increases with the number of revenue instruments and this problem is compounded 
by a reliance on indirect taxes that are less visible. Richard Wagner (1976) 
undertook the first test of the revenue-complexity hypothesis. The author 
implemented an index, the Herfindahl index, that is commonly used in the industrial-
organisation literature to measure the degree of concentration within an industry. On 
this basis, the revenue-complexity is measured as: 
 
                                                     (1) 
 
where ri is the fraction of total city revenue generated from tax source i.  
 
The Herfindahl index achieves its maximum value of unity when a jurisdiction 
generates all of its own revenues from a single source. It means that, the higher the 
value of the index, the less complicated tax system. Among the measures presenting 
fiscal illusion from the revenue-complexity perspective are such as: 
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• ratio of direct to indirect taxes – Clotfelter (1976), Dell’Anno and Dollery 
(2012), Buehn, Dell’Anno, Schneider (2015), 
• Herfindahl revenue complexity with different visibility weightings – 
Pommerehne and Schneider (1978), 
• Hannah and Kay index (HK index), representing the reciprocal of 
concentration index (HHC) – Heyndels and Smolders (1994), 
• Herfindahl revenue complexity – Munley and Greene (1978), Baker (1983), 
Ratmanova and Wroblowsky (2012), Dell’Anno and Dollery (2012), Buehn, 
Dell’Anno, Schneider (2015), Rakow (2016), 
• measure of breadth of revenue system (number of different instruments) – 
Breeden and Hunter (1985), Hendrick (2002), Carroll (2009), Carroll and 
Johnson (2010), 
• Herfindahl  revenue complexity (Oates), income elasticity, visible tax 
concentration ratio – Misołek and Elder (1988), 
• proportion owner occupied,  (Herfindahl) revenue complexity, dummies for 
grant and utility reliance, indirectness of revenue system – Worthington 
(1994), 
• ratio of municipal enterprise revenues to total municipal revenues – Haug 
(2009). 
 
Secondly, the revenue-elasticity hypothesis, tested for the first time by Oates (1975), 
assumes that high income-elasticities of tax revenue are likely to increase fiscal 
illusion. Buchanan (1967) argues that: “In a period of rapidly increasing national 
product, that tax institution characterised by the highest (income) elasticity will 
tend, other things equal, to generate the largest volume of public spending”. In the 
light of this approach, a relatively high income elasticity of revenue system leads to 
larger increments in general income, and this increase will be “automatically” 
funneled into increased expenditure (Dollery and Worthington, 1996). The other 
authors who tested this hypothesis, Craig and Heins (1980) also reported a positive 
relationship between high income elasticities of tax revenue and high levels of 
government expenditure. They supported “… the idea that elasticity drives 
spending”. In turn, Di Lorenzo (1982) and Feenberg and Rosen (1987) did not find a 
significant relationship between higher income elasticities of tax revenue and higher 
levels of public sector spending. The most common measures used to test the 
revenue-elasticity hypothesis are: 
 
• ACIR  revenue elasticity, individual  income  taxes, corporation income 
taxes, total income tax receipts as a percentage  of total tax receipts –  Oates 
(1975), 
• ACIR estimates of elasticity income of state taxes – Craig and Heins (1980), 
• Herfindahl  revenue complexity (Oates) income elasticity – Baker (1983), 
• measure of progressivity of state income tax – Hunter and Scott  (1987), 
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• Herfindahl  revenue complexity (Oates), income elasticity, visible tax 
concentration ratio – Misołek and Elder (1988), 
• Herfindahl revenue complexity (Oates) income elasticity, percentage of non-
owner, occupied residences, grant income equivalent divided by total 
income – Heyndels and Smolders (1994), 
• Herfindahl revenue complexity (Oates) income elasticity, ratio of direct to 
indirect taxes, dummy variables  for reliance on grant income – Dollery and 
Worthington (1995), Creedy and Gemmell (2002), 
• income elasticities of sales taxes and personal income taxation – Abbott, 
Jones (2016). 
 
Thirdly, “the flypaper effects” hypothesis was identified by Gramlich and Galper 
(1973) but many other studies have also reported its existence e.g. Hines and Thaler 
(1995) or Bailey and Connolly (1998). This source of fiscal illusion appears at the 
local level when taxpayers do not directly see, hence misperceive, the flows of 
grants from higher levels of government to their local governments, which, in turn, 
leads them to systematically underestimate the tax price of local spending. This 
misperception causes two widely recognised effects. The first, the overspending 
effect, suggests that public spending is greater under fiscal illusion than under 
perfect information. The second, the flypaper effect, is the prediction that increases 
in intergovernmental aid receipts tend to stimulate more local public spending than 
do comparable increases in voter - taxpayer  income (Turnbull, 1998).  
 
The issue of the flypaper effect have been tested empirically by many researchers. 
Many of them have incorporated grant distortions into studies directed at other forms 
of fiscal illusion, such as the revenue-complexity hypothesis or the elasticity 
hypothesis. These include Oates (1975),Wagner (1976), Goetz (1977), Munley and 
Greene (1978), Craig and Heines (1980), DiLorenzo (1982), Breeden and Hunter 
(1985). The results of their research proved that intergovernmental grants are the 
important determinant of the level of public expenditure. Testing the flypaper effect 
hypothesis, the researchers use the following measures: 
 
• Herfindahl revenue complexity, dummy variable for municipalities 
practising internal subsidisation (utility profits) – DiLorenzo (1982), 
• estimated per capita tax windfall – Marshall (1989, 1991), 
• federal and state unconditional grants, state unconditional grants, federal + 
state categorical grants – Grossman (1990), 
• Herfindahl revenue complexity (Oates), income elasticity, percentage non-
owner occupied,  grant income divided by total income – Dollery and 
Worthington (1995), 
• Herfindahl revenue complexity, (Oates) income elasticity, ratio of direct to 
indirect taxes, dummy variables for reliance on grant income – Dollery and 
Worthington (1995), 
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• total expenditure of municipal authorities per capita, total revenues 
generated by municipalities per capita, fiscal or revenue raising capacity of 
municipal authorities per capita, expenditure needs per capita – Amusa, 
Mabunda and Mabugu (2008), 
• grants received by local government per capita – Haug (2009), 
• Herfindahl index of state revenue proportion, percentage of revenue 
originating locally, the amount of state borrowing and the total stock of debt 
– Abbot,  Jones (2016). 
 
The next hypothesis – renter illusion –  occurs when local taxes are levied on the 
owners of the property and not on their tenants. In this case illusion refers to tenants 
who do not understand the link between the level of local spending and the level of 
rent they pay. Renters believe that the costs of government expenditure are low 
(even if taxes are shifted forward in rent charges). It seems that so long as the actual 
tax-price is underestimated, rental voters will support higher levels of public 
expenditure and would therefore bias expenditures upwards. The results of empirical 
studies devoted to this hypothesis are mixed. Several studies supported the 
hypothesis of rent illusion (Peterson, 1975; Lovell, 1978; Gronberg 1980; Heyndels 
and Smolders, 1994; Worthington, 1994). However, most studies have also given 
either implicit or explicit consideration of the alternate hypothesis of “renter 
rationality” (Barr and Davis, 1966; Hanushek, 1975; Beck, 1984; Brazer and 
McCarty, 1987) or criticised the main assumption of rent illusion hypothesis 
(Martinez-Vazquez, 1983; 1988). Among the measures adopted for the purpose of 
verification of the rent illusion hypothesis are: 
 
• percentage of electorate owning properties – Barr and Davies (1966), 
• percentage of municipal housing owner occupied – Bergstrom and 
Goodman's (1973), 
• percentage of adult renters in school district, Dummy variable for renter 
status –Peterson (1975), 
• percentage of homes owner-occupied in town – Lovell (1978), 
• percentage of owner occupied in local area –  Gronberg (1980),  
• percentage of renters in precinct – Martinez-Vazquez (1983),  
• dummy variable for homeownership – Schokkaert (1987), 
• Herfindahl  revenue complexity (Oates) income elasticity, percentage 
non-owner occupied, grant income divided by total income – Heyndels 
and Smolders (1994), 
• proportion owner occupied, (Herfindahl) revenue complexity, dummies 
for grant and utility reliance, indirectness of revenue system – 
Worthington (1994), 
• perception of the land tax system, land tax rate, land tax revenue, tax 
structure –Blom-Hansen (2005), 
A. Wildowicz-Giegiel, A. Kargol-Wasiluk 
  
679  
• percentage of residential buildings with up two accommodation units, 
rent of owner occupation – Haug (2009), 
• percentage of owners, percentage of renters, tax property per house, fees 
for public services, tax capitalisation in houses price – Dell’Anno and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2013). 
 
The last potential source of fiscal illusion is known as debt illusion hypothesis. 
Vickrey (1961) refers to "a public debt illusion" … (when) individuals pay no 
attention to their share in the liability represented by the public debt ... (Abbott and 
Jones, 2016). The argument here is that individuals are more likely to perceive the 
costs of public goods provision  if they pay for them through current taxation than if 
tax liabilities are deferred through public-sector borrowing. Voters usually ignore 
future tax liabilities and are more tend to accept government borrowing that appears 
to reduce the costs of taxation. It has to be simultaneously underlined that the debt 
illusion hypothesis is contrary to the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, which holds 
that individuals recognise the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and are 
thus aware that any change in current taxes must be offset by a change in future 
taxes. 
  
The phenomenon of fiscal illusion – in the context of public debt – became a subject 
of many empirical studies: Oates (1969), Epple and Schipper (1981) or Dalamagas 
(1992; 1993). In the case of this hypothesis the most common measures are:  
 
• degree of capitalisation – Oates (1969), Epple and Schipper (1981), 
• consumption expenditures relative to debt levels – Dalamagas (1992; 
1993), 
• debt per capita, ratio of municipal enterprise liabilities to total 
municipal debts –Haug (2009), 
• public debt as a percentage of GDP –  Buehn, Dell’Anno, Schneider 
(2015), Gérard, Ngangnué (2015). 
 
4. The Rationale for the Construction of Fiscal Illusion Index in the Light 
of Institutional Approach 
 
On the basis of literature devoted to the problem of fiscal illusion it can be said that 
this phenomenon embraces different dimensions and because of its complexity 
methodological difficulties arise. Irrespective of them, the construction of index, 
consisting of different dimensions, is strongly suggested by researchers who are 
involved in such kind of studies. A useful, albeit nascent, empirical approach to this 
problem resides in the estimation of Index of Fiscal Illusion which should be 
appropriate for the purpose of international comparisons, as mentioned in 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatόn (1999), Nardo et al. (2005), Mourão (2005), 
and Dell’Anno and Dollery (2012). 
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Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatόn (1999) focused on constructing aggregate 
indicators of bureaucratic quality, rule of law and corruption for a sample of 160 
countries. Their methodology of construction aggregate governance indicators 
turned out to be useful because it allows the countries to be sorted into broad 
groupings according to levels of governance, and enables conducting the analysis 
regarding causes and consequences of fiscal movements in a much larger sample of 
countries than previously used. Nardo et al. (2005) also used composite indicators 
which can summarise complex and sometimes elusive issues in view of supporting 
decision makers and have proven useful in benchmarking country performance. 
Furthrrmore, Mourão (2005) proposed  the  way of building the Index of Fiscal 
Illusion in 68 countries since 1960. The results of Fiscal Illusion Index can provide 
benchmarks for evaluating the comparative performance of different democratic 
countries, discerning long-term trends, and uncovering good governance practices in 
minimising fiscal illusion. The equally interesting study was conducted by 
Dell’Anno and Dollery (2012) who applied structural equation modeling (SEM) in 
order to estimate the Index of Fiscal Illusion for the European Union countries.  
 
There is lots of studies considering the procedures for constructing the indexes of 
complex political and economic realities. For example, Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
elaborated the Index of Budgetary Institutions including ten basic dimensions, such 
as: constitutional constrains, legal requirement for the approval of a macro program, 
borrowing constrains, authority of minister of finances, amendments by the 
Congress, consequences of Congress’ rejection of the Budget, opportunity to modify 
the Budget after Congress’ approval, opportunity to cut spending by the Government 
after Congress’ approval, assumption by the Government of other political 
Agencies’ debt, and autonomy of these other Agencies to borrow. On the basis of 
values returned from the index and the existing budgetary practices of control, the 
authors classified Latin American countries concluding that transparent procedures 
go along with more fiscal discipline.  
 
Inspired by the study of Alesina et al. (1996), Hameed (2005) focused on the Fiscal 
Transparency and as a result elaborated indices of fiscal transparency for a broad 
range of countries based on the IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency. The author used data derived from published fiscal transparency 
modules of the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes. The indices 
embrace four clusters of fiscal transparency practices: data assurances, medium-term 
budgeting, budget execution reporting, and fiscal risk disclosures. The results of the 
study confirmed that more transparent countries have better credit ratings, better 
financial discipline, and less corruption.  
 
Alt and Lassen (2006) also constructed transparency index regarding 19 advanced 
industrialised OECD countries in the 1990s. The index consists of 11 items taken 
from OECD’s Best Practices for Budget Transparency. The authors took into 
account four distinct categories, such as: independent verification by independently 
audited financial reports, easy access and monitoring governance practices by 
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external agents, clear and pre-defined budget syntax, and the presence of more 
justification of decisions which solidifies the basis for decision making. Their 
empirical study confirmed that fiscal transparency improves fiscal performance. 
Similarly, Bernoth and Wolff (2006) investigated governmental international 
transparency using two measures. One of them – called Audit – measures whether 
governments are financially audited externally, how independent the auditing can be 
performed and how well the obtained information is disseminated.  
 
The other indicator – called Transparency – was introduced by von Hagen (1992), 
extended in Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2001)  and updated in Hallerberg, 
Strauch, and von Hagen (2005). It is a measure of informativeness and transparency 
of the budget draft, aiming at the assessment of transparency given by government 
officials, the degree to which special funds are included in the budget draft, the 
information whether the budget consists of one document, whether it is linked to 
national accounts and finally whether government loans are included. The empirical 
results proved the importance of fiscal transparency for the credibility of 
government. 
 
A growing body of empirical and theoretical literature has dealt with issues related 
to the quality of institutions. Following the approach von Hagen (1992), the indexes 
which summarise institutional characteristic of the budget preparation, authorisation 
and implementation stages were used by Gleich (2003) to study the relation between 
structure of business processes and fiscal outcomes. The analysis revealed that 
countries having institutional structures that are more conducive to strengthen 
coordination and cooperation in budget decision-making have been associated with 
lower budget deficits and reduced debt levels.  
 
Hallenberg et al. (2007) also built an indicator of fiscal governance based on the 
three phases of budget process the preparation stage, in which budget draft is 
elaborated, the approval stage, in which the budget draft is reviewed, approved and 
formalised, and the implementation stage, where the budget is implemented and 
which may be subjected to modifications and amendments by the minister of finance 
and/or by the parliament. It is worth stressing that the authors found a strong 
evidence for a direct relationship between institutional setup and fiscal discipline.  
 
The other index used to describe the quality of institutions in public finance sphere– 
called Fiscal Rule Index – proposed by Deroose, Moulin and Wierts (2005) was 
calculated on the basis of five criteria: the statutory base of the rule, the room for 
revising objectives, the mechanism of monitoring compliance and enforcement of 
the rule, the existence of pre-enforcement  mechanisms and media visibility of the 
rule. The overall Fiscal Rule Index is created from a set of sub-indices. Each sub-
index is a simply sum of the above indicated criteria. Similarly, Kumar et al. (2009) 
defined an index of strength of fiscal rules by aggregating the variables obtained in 
the principal component analysis, such as:  enforcement score, coverage score, legal 
basis score, supranational rules score, index of supporting procedures for monitoring 
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of compliance and enforcement, flexibility score, average number of fiscal rules, and 
the ratio of national to total fiscal rules in each country. 
 
Next Schaechter et al. (2012) constructed fiscal rules indices for each type of fiscal 
rules and each key characteristic, which are then combined into an overall index. 
The authors included into the analysis the four sub-indices for each type of fiscal 
rules. Moreover, each sub-index defined at the national and supranational level, is a 
sum of five or six indicators in the following pillars: legal basis, coverage, formal 
enforcement procedure, expenditure ceilings, fiscal responsibility law, independent 
body setting, budget assumptions and monitoring the budget implementation. All 
sub-indices are standardised to vary between zero and five. It should be emphasised 
that the literature has found statistically significant positive effects of Fiscal Rule 
Index on fiscal performance (see for example, Debrun et al. 2008; Afonso and 
Hauptmeier, 2009). The conducted analysis by Schaechter et al. (2012), which 
embraced 81 countries from 1985 to end - March 2012, allowed him to conclude that 
formal institutional setup supports fiscal discipline and is particularly desired in the 
situation of the recent public finance crisis.  
 
Following the institutional approach, Giosi et al. (2014) proposed the overall index 
of fiscal governance (FG Index). The construction of the index was built on the 
questions selected by the European Commission to set up a single index for 
describing fiscal governance in the European Union. The results of the conducted 
study revealed a positive connection between the level of fiscal governance in the 
Member States and the financial surplus in the period concerned. 
 
5. The Methodology of Measurement of Fiscal Illusion  
 
In the conducted study “Taxation trends in European Union. Data for the EU 
Member States, Island and Norway”, Eurostat Statistics and International Country 
Risk Guide databases were used. On the basis of the literature review, different 
dimensions of fiscal illusion, along with their indicators/measures, were taken into 
consideration. The analysis covered the euro area countries in years 2004-2016.  
 
At the beginning, because fiscal illusion consists of different components 
representing by indicators which are measured in a different way, one of the 
methods of normalisation – percentile rank – was implemented. It was also assumed 
that if the expected effect of the variable on fiscal illusion was negative, then the 
rank was reordered, considering the difference between 1 and the percentile rank. 
 
For the purpose of measuring the phenomenon of fiscal illusion, the Multiway 
Principal Components Analysis (MPCA) was conducted using program IBM SPSS 
Statistics 25. A principal component is defined as a linear combination of optimally 
weighted observed variables. According to the assumptions of PCA, there are Q 
variables in a dataset  which variance can be explained by a smaller number of 
variables – principal components Z1 Z2…ZQ    










The lack of correlation among principal components indicates that they measure 
different “statistical dimension” in the data. The weights aij (factor loadings) applied 
to the variables xj in the system of equations, which are above presented, and the 
principal components Zij should satisfy the following conditions:  
 
• they are uncorrelated (orthogonal), 
• the first principal component accounts for the maximum possible 
proportion of the variance of the set of x’s, the second principal 
component shows the maximum of the remaining variance and so on 
until the last of the principal component which absorbs all the remaining 
variance no accounted for by the preceding components. 
•  





where the diagonal element cmii is the variance of xi and cmij is the covariance of 
variables xi and xj. The eigenvalues of the above matrix are the variances of the 
principal components and can be found by solving the equation CM –λI = 0, while I 
is the identity matrix with the same order as CM, and λ is the vector of eigenvalues. 
 
Under the process of MPCA the number of principal components which explain the 
variation of the observed variables and the matrix with the rotated factor loadings for 
fiscal illusion variables were obtained. Next in the construction of Fiscal Illusion 
Index, the approach proposed by Nicoletti et al. (2000) and Mourão (2007) was 
adopted. On the basis of the selected approach, the sub-indicators with highest factor 
loadings were grouped in intermediate composite indicators, which number is equal 
to the number of factors. It was assumed that each intermediate composite indicators 
with a significant factor loading above 0,7 has a weight equal to the square of the 
factor loading divided by the explained variation by the factor. Moreover, to 
calculate Fiscal illusion Index, each intermediate composite indicator should have a 
weight equal to its proportion of the variance explained by all the factors. The 
aggregation of them allows us to obtain the overall Index of Fiscal Illusion. The final 
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value given to each country-year observation was rescaled, using the percentile rank 
but considering now all weighted values (Mourão, 2007, p. 15). 
 
6. The Size of Fiscal Illusion in the Euro Area Countries 
 
Before starting the PCA procedures, both the Alfa Cronbach and the KMO statistics 
were checked. The measure of Alfa Cronbach was 0,753, while the KMO achieved 
the value of 0,721. The obtained results are satisfactory and statistically significant. 
The Principal Component Analysis showed that only five of eighteen factors 
(principal components for fiscal illusion) were retained according to Kaiser criterion 
(with eigenvalues above 1), and it is worth to underline that these factors account for 
87% of the total variation.  
 
Table 1. Components loadings for fiscal illusion variables 
Component 
Initial eigen values 
Total % of variance Cumulative % 
1 6,227 34,594 34,594 
2 3,928 21,821 56,415 
3 2,456 13,644 70,059 
4 1,828 10,153 80,212 
5 1,198 6,655 86,867 
Source: Own calculations: Extraction Method – Principal Component Analysis done in 
SPSS. 
 
The choice of 5 factors which explain most of the variability in the data was 
additionally confirmed by the screen plot proposed by Cattell (1966). Then through 
the Principal Components Extraction Method with varimax normalised variation, the 
rotated factor loadings for fiscal illusion variables were achieved.  
 
On the basis of the rotated component matrix presented in Table 2, it has to be said 
that the first factor has high positive coefficients (loadings above 0,7) with the 
following variables: TotalR (0,759), Ltax (0,931), LocCtax (0,740), SSCt (0,915) 
and PsExpend (0,756). The factor first explains phenomenon of fiscal illusion 
through the prism of exceeding public revenues (TotalR) and social expenditures 
(PsExpend), labour taxation consisting of personal income taxes (Ltax ) and social 
security contributions (SSCt), and the level of fiscal federalism (LocCtax) in the EU-
19 countries. The second factor is represented by the group of  institutional 
variables, such as: GovEffect (0,934), RQuality (0,899), RLaw (0,956) and CorruptC 
(0,936). In the case of the second factor, it seems evident that the size of fiscal 
illusion depends on the quality of formal institutions. Government effectiveness 
(GovEffect) understood as the quality of public services, regulatory quality 
(RQuality) perceived as the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations permitting and promoting private sector development, 
rules of law (RLaw) and control of corruption (CorruptC) are the most important 
among them.  
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The third factor builds: Dtax (0,767) and Capitaltax (0,891). It means that fiscal 
illusion appears along with the increase in direct taxation (Dtax) and especially 
capital taxation (Capitaltax). The fourth factor is determined by Intax (0,933), Ctax 
(0,931) and EduExpend (0,760). Taking it into account, we can say that the size of 
fiscal illusion is determined by indirect tax burdens, including consumption taxes, 
and what is more by the amounts spend on education. Finally, the fifth factor has 
high positive loading (above 0,7) only in the case of public debt (0,769).  
 
Table 2. Rotated component matrix for fiscal illusion variables 
 
Components 
1 2 3 4 5 
GovEffect -0,190 0,934 -0,095 -0,089 0,058 
RQuality -0,014 0,899 0,002 0,075 0,254 
RLaw -0,089 0,956 -0,097 -0,104 0,009 
CorruptC -0,200 0,936 -0,111 -0,054 0,053 
TotalR 0,759 -0,238 0,566 0,124 -0,032 
 InTax -0,078 -0,035 -0,076 0,933 -0,126 
Dtax 0,283 -0,445 0,767 -0,135 -0,062 
Ctax -0,078 0,077 0,050 0,931 -0,058 
 Ltax 0,931 -0,227 0,125 -0,036 -0,021 
Capitaltax 0,044 -0,120 0,891 -0,204 0,017 
LocCtax 0,740 0,009 0,047 -0,130 0,045 
SSCt 0,915 -0,095 -0,084 -0,089 0,037 
TGovExpend 0,656 -0,086 0,353 0,135 0,598 
 GPublServ 0,193 0,160 0,691 0,182 0,550 
 EduExpen -0,009 -0,178 -0,161 0,760 0,091 
 PsExpend 0,756 -0,180 0,391 -0,017 0,350 
 Deficit -0,002 -0,209 0,143 0,102 -0,924 
Debt 0,171 0,184 0,532 -0,134 0,769 
Source: Own calculations: Extraction Method – Principal Component Analysis done in 
SPSS. 
 
The next step was to calculate the intermediate indicators for factors from F1 to F5 
according to the chosen procedure (using data from table 1 and Table 2). Each 
intermediate indicator is a weighted average of the normalised variables with a 
significant factor loading (greater than 0,7). For example, the first intermediate 
indicator is calculated as follows:       




and so on until F5.  
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To measure the Fiscal Illusion Index (FII), the Fiscal Illusion Indicators were 
weighted in accordance with the formula:     
                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                (5) 
. 
 
Table 3 presents the size of FIIs for the EU-19 countries which were divided into 
four groups depending on the value of index obtained in years 2004 and 201610.  
 
Table 3. The size of Fiscal Illusion Index in the euro area 
Year 2004 2016 








EE CY DE BE EE IE DE BE 
IE MT EL IT LT LT ES EL 
LV NL FR  LU MT CY FR 
LT PT AT   NL SI IT 
LU ES FI   SK FI PT 
 SI    
 
 CY 
 SK    
 
 AT 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
The data presented in Table 3 shows that in 2004 the lowest values of IIF were 
observed only in two countries of the old 15-E, such as: Ireland (IE) and 
Luxembourg (LU), as well as in the three Baltic States represented by Lithuania 
(LT), Latvia (LT) and Estonia (EE). The highest values of IIF were simultaneously 
noticed in Belgium (BE) and Italy (IT). It should be stressed that the size of the 
fiscal illusion phenomenon in the euro area countries increased significantly in 2016. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the group of countries with the lowest size of fiscal 
illusion has shrunk to three countries: Estonia (EE), Lithuania (LT) and Luxemburg 
(LU), while the number of countries with the highest values of index increased to 
seven. The group is mainly represented by Southern European countries, such as: 
Portugal (PT), Greece (EL), Italy (IT) and Cyprus (CY). In addition, France (FR), 
Belgium (BE) and Austria (AT) joined them in 2016. 
 
Table 4 presents the comparison of Fiscal Illusion Index in years 2004 and 2016. It 
has to be emphasized that the estimated level of fiscal illusion increased 




10The Fiscal Illusion Index, as a percentile ranking, shows how a country-year observation 
performs compared to the other country-year observations at its position. Following the 
assumptions, higher values of the index indicate higher level of fiscal illusion. 
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Table 4. Fiscal Illusion Index for 19-EU countries 
Countries 
Fiscal Illusion Index (FII) 
2004 2016 2016/2004 
average in years  
2004-2016 
Belgium 0,846 0,915 0,07 0,872 
Germany 0,502 0,623 0,12 0,613 
Estonia 0,028 0,142 0,11 0,07 
Ireland 0,07 0,275 0,21 0,302 
Greece 0,628 0,999 0,37 0,849 
Spain 0,295 0,656 0,36 0,442 
France 0,672 0,931 0,26 0,809 
Italy 0,831 0,988 0,16 0,935 
Cyprus 0,36 0,805 0,45 0,526 
Latvia 0,02 0,299 0,28 0,168 
Lithuania 0,02 0,215 0,20 0,141 
Luxemburg 0,07 0,19 0,12 0,159 
Malta 0,47 0,397 -0,07 0,470 
Netherlands 0,332 0,494 0,16 0,412 
Austria 0,634 0,822 0,19 0,736 
Portugal 0,38 0,903 0,52 0,701 
Slovenia 0,356 0,749 0,39 0,519 
Slovakia 0,32 0,34 0,02 0,240 
Finland 0,522 0,729 0,21 0,574 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
The biggest increase in the value of the index was observed in Portugal (+0,52) and 
Cyprus (+0,45). In conclusion, the study revealed that in the analyzed period Italy 
(with the average value of FII at the level of 0,935) had the highest level of fiscal 
illusion against the background of the group, while the lowest level of fiscal illusion 




Fiscal illusion as a multidimensional and not directly observed phenomenon is a 
subject of numerous theoretical and empirical studies. In the public finance 
literature, attention has mainly focused on five hypotheses (sources) of fiscal 
illusion: complexity of tax revenue system, income elasticity of tax structure, 
flypaper effect, renter illusion and debt illusion. The analysis of the above mentioned 
hypotheses proved that the misperception of individuals refers to the real amounts of 
government revenue and expenditure, and these are the consequences of the lack of 
transparency in public finance. Under the conditions of complicated revenue system 
it is difficult for taxpayer to estimate the tax-burden associated with public 
programs.  
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The literature indicates that the high income-elasticities of tax revenue additionally 
increase the problem of fiscal illusion and “automatically” lead to the increase in 
government expenditure. What is more, complex fiscal relations between central and 
local governments caused by  decentralization of public finance are responsible for a 
new fiscal illusion which in known as flypaper effect. At the local level, another 
kind of fiscal illusion, identified as renter illusion, appears. It happens because 
renters are not usually conscious of the link between the level of local spending and 
the level of rent they pay. Apart from that it should be emphasized that the issue of 
fiscal illusion is often analyzed in context of increasing debt. If individuals pay no 
attention to their share in the liability represented by the public debt, debt illusion is 
a subject of analysis. 
 
The paper highlights both the theoretical and the empirical aspects of fiscal illusion. 
Despite some methodological limits, which arise during the construction of fiscal 
illusion, the authors managed to build the index of fiscal illusion (FII) and estimate 
the size of fiscal illusion in the euro area countries in years 2004-16. For this 
purpose, a particularly valuable methodology of measurement implemented by 
Mourão (2007) was adopted. After the identification of the theoretical framework, 
eighteen variables have been chosen. Thanks to Multiway Principal Component 
Analysis the number of variables describing the phenomenon of fiscal illusion was 
reduced to five factors (principal components for fiscal illusion) which explained 
87% of the total variation.  
 
These five components were built on the basis of different measures/indicators that 
can be assigned to the selected dimensions of fiscal illusion that were presented by 
authors in the theoretical part of the paper. It is worth stressing that high positive 
loading (above 0,7) also appeared in the case of the variable identified with formal 
institutions (e.g., rules of law or government effectiveness). The results of the 
empirical analysis allows to indicate the interesting suggestion for future research. It 
seems that a special attention should be paid to the issue of the quality of institutions 
(both formal and informal) and their impact on the size of fiscal illusion. Moreover, 
the number of indicators characterizing the analyzed dimension should also be 
broadened. Calculation of the fiscal illusion indicators for five component factors, in 
line with the adopted formula, allowed the measurement of the Fiscal Illusion Index 
in the euro area countries. The case of Southern European economies, especially 
Italy and Greece, confirmed that the problem of fiscal illusion depends on the public 
finance discipline and is determined by institutional factors.  
 
As a rule, countries with transparent and responsible fiscal policy based on various 
types of fiscal rules are less willing to increase public expenditure and have lower 
public debt. However, the study reveals that increasing public revenue caused by 
particularly high taxation of labour, embracing personal income taxes and social 
security contributions, as well as the increasing social expenditure are the most 
decisive factors responsible for the size of fiscal illusion in the euro area. 
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